Chapter 5

  1. See Committee on Defense Manufacturing (1996), James Fallows (2002), and John Birkler et al. (2001).

  2. Department of Defense (1993).

  3. For more on the specifics of the JSF, see Bill Breen (2002), Fallows (2002), Federation of Atomic Scientists (2001), David H. Freedman (2002), Nova (2003), and United States Air Force (2002).

  4. Given the almost ten-year time lag from the conception of the JSF F-35 strategy to its realization in 2010, we would argue that its success is in no way secured. As heads of the military and Pentagon change during this time, the challenge will be to hold tight to the JSF's value curve. It is essential not to slip into the "defense deal spiral" of behind-the-scenes bargaining for "just a little more" customization and, with it, ballooning costs and a resultant blurred value curve. To avoid this, the Pentagon, in conjunction with Lockheed Martin, will have to ensure that each branch of the military adheres to the strategic profile agreed to in the strategy canvas of JSF F-35. So far, it looks good, but the military cannot afford to relax. This is an ongoing mission.